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Abstract 
Over the past two decades, international criminal law has been increasingly institutionalized 
and has become one of the dominant frames for defining issues of justice and conflict 
resolution. Indeed, international criminal law is often presented as the road towards global 
justice. But the rise of international criminal law and its equation with global justice come 
with a profound risk: alternative conceptions of justice can be marginalized. Based on field 
work in Uganda and Sudan, we present five examples of alternative conceptions of justice 
that in fact have been side-lined: the restoration of relationships, putting an end to on-going 
violence, redistribution, non-criminal law forms of punishment and equality. However, 
international criminal law’s monopolization of discourses of justice threatens not only 
alternative conceptions of justice, but also international criminal law itself. It frustrates one of 
its main aims: the protection of diversity.   
1. Monopolizing Global Justice 
Human longing for justice stands in a paradoxical relation to the institutional practices 
designed to satisfy this desire. While the ideals of justice need institutional translation in 
order to be effective, the very same institutionalization may corrupt the ideals that we hold 
dear. As Jack Balkin has observed:1 
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Human law, culture, and convention are never perfectly just, but justice needs human 
law, culture, and convention to be articulated and enforced. There is a fundamental 
inadequation between our sense of justice and the products of culture, but we can only 
express this inadequation through the cultural means at our disposal…Hence, our laws 
are imperfect not because they are bad copies of a determinate Form of justice, but 
because we must articulate our insatiable longing for justice in concrete institutions, 
and our constructions can never be identical with the longings which inspire them.
2
 
The implication is that because positive laws and institutions are imperfect articulations of 
justice at best, they should always be open to contestation and revision. Specifically, existing 
institutions need to leave room for alternative articulations of justice and thus refrain from 
attempts to monopolize discourses on justice.  
The caution against the monopolization of discourses on justice is even more pertinent 
when claims are made in the name of ‘global justice’. Adding the adjective ‘global’ implies 
that something bigger and higher is at stake than in the case of ‘local’, ‘ordinary’ or ‘national’ 
justice. In the case of ‘global’ justice, the issues concerned transcend the values, institutions 
and interests of directly affected communities. The promotion of global justice is invoked as 
a justification for interventions by outside agents acting in the name of the values and 
interests of a cosmopolitan community. However, the global society in which global justice is 
supposed to operate is even more pluralist than its domestic or subnational counterparts. 
Within the pluralist global society, numerous articulations of justice coexist, overlap and 
compete.
3
 Conceptions of global justice that effectively silence or marginalize alternative 
interpretations of what is just are therefore deeply problematic (just like ‘non-global’ 
conceptions of justice that do the same). Defining socio-political issues in terms of ‘global’ 
requires openness to the various alternative articulations of justice that could be longed for, 
experienced and struggled for in the situations at hand.  
In theory, international criminal law and the aim of protecting diversity, including 
diversity in conceptions of justice, go hand in hand. For one of the justifications for the 
international criminalization of certain conduct is that this conduct amounts to, in Hannah 
Arendt’s famous words, ‘an attack on human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic 
of the “human status” without which the very words “mankind” or “humanity” would be 
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devoid of meaning’.4 To Arendt, plurality — ‘the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world’ — is so essential because all politics and human action are conditional 
upon it: ‘While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this 
plurality is specifically the condition — not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio 
per quam — of all political life.’5  In this sense, the quest for justice also presupposes 
plurality, because articulations of justice can be questioned, challenged and revised only 
through human (political) action. Plurality, therefore, is essentially related to what it is to be 
human: ‘Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, 
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or 
will live.’6 In sum, for Arendt, crimes against humanity are international crimes because they 
transcend domestic boundaries; and they transcend domestic boundaries because they are an 
attack on human diversity as such. Crimes against humanity threaten the very conditions for 
politics and human action by corrupting the idea that the world is a place to be shared by 
peoples living in a multitude of cultures, habits, identities and indeed, conceptions of justice.7   
Of the various justifications for international criminal justice, the Preamble of the 
Rome Statute establishing and governing the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) 
also reflects the rationale of protecting diversity, acknowledging as it does the existence of a 
pluralistic humanity in the form of ‘peoples (...) united by common bonds, their cultures 
pieced together in a shared heritage’, while expressing concern ‘that this delicate mosaic may 
be shattered at any time’ by ‘unimaginable atrocities that shock the conscience of mankind’. 
At least part of the rationale for the establishment of the ICC is thus to achieve accountability 
for crimes that constitute an attack on the idea of a pluralistic humanity. Through the 
prosecution of some of the crimes within its jurisdiction, the ICC is to promote and protect 
diversity. 
Arendt’s justification for international criminalization of certain conduct is one among 
many and cannot be regarded as the justification for international criminal law.
8
 However, its 
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acceptance as one of the rationales for international criminal law denotes important 
boundaries for international criminal law itself. It implies that international criminal law, 
irrespective of its other rationales, should itself never undermine the fundamental aim that it 
is meant to promote: the protection of diversity.  
To be sure, we do not directly attribute this argument to Arendt, for whom the need to 
protect human diversity mainly functioned as a justification for international criminal law.9 
However, now international criminal law has established itself as one of the dominant frames 
through which political conflicts are read, it is necessary to rethink the relation between 
international criminal law and the need to protect human diversity. May it also be the case 
that international criminal law is endangering the very plurality it is meant to protect? 
We argue that there are indeed signs that international criminal law runs the risk of 
undermining one of its own foundations. This paradoxical phenomenon is the end-result of 
four inter-related developments. First, international criminal tribunals are constantly 
confronted with the gap that Jack Balkin identified between the ideals of justice, on the one 
hand, and the institutional and political realities in which they operate, on the other. They 
have been created to satisfy a longing for global accountability, redress for victims and 
fairness for accused, but in practice only part of the world is called to account, victims find 
little redress in international criminal proceedings10 and accused’s fair trial rights suffer from 
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the embrace of illiberal criminal doctrines.
11
 The reality produced by tribunals created to 
serve international justice (necessarily) falls short of the ideal of justice. 
Secondly, the field of international criminal law — by which we mean international 
criminal tribunals and international criminal law scholars, states, international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations promoting international criminal justice — has 
responded to this harsh reality mostly by working on more international criminal law. With a 
view to overcoming the shortcomings, the field has argued for a wider personal and territorial 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals; more victim-oriented arrangements within 
international criminal law; and, to a lesser extent, more work on a fair procedure for the 
accused. International criminal law’s limitations are thus neither accepted nor considered a 
reason to use less of it. Instead, the limitations are fought with attempts to have more and 
higher-quality international criminal law. Consequently, the search for justice is more and 
more institutionalized, and specifically, more and more tribunalized: international criminal 
tribunals are increasingly present and influential.
12
  
The third development is that, partly as a consequence of this tribunalization, 
international criminal law has become an increasingly popular frame for defining issues of 
justice. The framing of political issues in terms of international criminal law already occurred 
before the spread of international tribunals, as is illustrated by the ‘crime of apartheid’. 
However, with international tribunals enforcing the law, international criminal law has turned 
into an even more powerful frame to articulate injustices and to pursue political causes. 
Whilst the tribunals’ physical enforcement powers may still be weak, its normative power 
holds sway all over the globe: irrespective of any actual court proceedings, those targeted by 
international criminal law are branded as enemies of mankind, whereas those who can side 
with the enforcement of international criminal law can rebrand themselves as friends of 
humanity.
13
 The importance of international criminal tribunals thus goes way beyond the few 
cases that they try. As a result of the tribunals’ work, international criminal law has become 
an important frame for the interpretation of the world. 
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It is thus that in the past two decades complex questions of armed conflict, identity 
politics and wealth distribution have been redefined in the expert vocabulary of international 
criminal law. International criminal law has become so successful that all kinds of parties 
have framed their political causes in its terms. Greek citizens have cast their grievances about 
austerity measures in the mould of international criminal law;
14
 electoral candidates have 
branded their opponents as international criminals and rebel movements have painted their 
opponents as genocidaires.
15
 Without claiming that international criminal law is the only 
game in town in world politics today, let us give a few recent examples of the (re)framing of 
political issues in terms of international criminal justice. The Security Council referred the 
conflict in Darfur to the ICC;
16
 so did it with respect to Libya in the Arab Spring.
17
 The 
Government of Uganda for its part adopted the frame of international criminal law to redefine 
its two-decade old war against the Lord’s Resistance Army.18 Presidential candidate Alassane 
Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire confirmed, at a time that his own presidency was still contested, the 
Ivorian acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction to deal with violence surrounding the elections 
that he claimed to have won.
19
 Advocacy groups and western states alike have been lobbying 
for a referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC. All these situations are (at least partially) 
framed in the language, concepts and structure of international criminal law. 
At times international criminal law is even presented as an indispensable frame. Take 
the way in which the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia presents itself at its 
own website:  
The Tribunal has laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm for conflict 
resolution and post-conflict development across the globe, specifically that leaders 
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suspected of mass crimes will face justice. The Tribunal has proved that efficient and 
transparent international justice is possible. 
The Tribunal has contributed to an indisputable historical record, combating denial 
and helping communities come to terms with their recent history.
20
 
The Tribunal openly takes pride in having established what it regards to be the accepted norm 
for dealing with conflicts and mass atrocities. 
The fourth development is that many of these situations have been framed not merely 
as a matter of international criminal law, international criminal justice, or justice more 
generally, but as a matter of ‘global justice’. The Ugandan government referred the ‘situation 
concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’ to the ICC, stating that it turned ‘to the newly 
established International Criminal Court and its promise of global justice’.21 As illustrated by 
the quotes in the Introduction to this Special Issue, proponents of international criminal 
tribunals in particular often equate the enforcement of international criminal law with the 
pursuit of global justice.  In this way, some issues are elevated to a level beyond the local, the 
national and even the inter-national, thus paving the way for outside interventions in the 
name of a more encompassing global community.  
In sum, in response to its shortcomings, international criminal law is increasingly 
expanded and institutionalized. As a result of that institutionalization, socio-political 
problems are more and more framed as matters of international criminal law, while 
international criminal law is ever more presented as the road to global justice.  
 
2. The Dark Side of the Monopolization of Global Justice 
 
This process of increased institutionalization, framing of issues as matters of 
international criminal law and equating international criminal law with ‘global justice’ is 
consequential. It runs the risk of monopolizing the debate about global justice by 
international criminal law. The term ‘global justice’ may still have a broader meaning in the 
context of social struggles against poverty and for access to basic services, but in response to 
armed conflict and so-called mass atrocities, international criminal law has increasingly 
owned up the term.  
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The dark side of the rise, institutionalization and framing in terms of international 
criminal law, and its equation with global justice, is thus that alternative conceptions of 
global justice are in danger of being pushed to the margins. What Arundhati Roy says about 
the impact of globalization on the visibility of people, also holds for the rise of international 
criminal law with respect to alternative conceptions of justice:  
… a light which shines brighter and brighter on a few people and the rest are in 
darkness, wiped out. They simply can’t be seen. … you stop seeing something and 
then, slowly, it’s not possible to see it. It never existed and there is no possibility of an 
alternative.
22
 
Just like the institutionalization of a particular meaning of development silences and 
disadvantages much of the world’s population,23  the institutionalization of global justice 
through international criminal tribunals potentially marginalises alternative conceptions of 
justice.24  
The monopolization of debates about global justice by international criminal law thus 
does the opposite of what the gap between ideas of (global) justice and existing institutions 
requires, namely protecting openness towards alternative understandings of what justice 
means. And when the rise of international criminal law results in a marginalization of other 
articulations of justice, it risks corrupting one of the very ideals that international criminal 
law is meant to protect.     
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3. Alternative Conceptions of Justice 
We give five examples of possible alternative conceptions of justice25 and illustrate how with 
the increasing equation of international criminal law with global justice, it has become more 
difficult for political groups to prioritise diverse conceptions of justice in a way that does not 
put international criminal law on top.  
The five examples became apparent during research in Uganda and Sudan. Against 
this background, three preliminary clarifications are in place. First, we present these 
examples as alternative conceptions of ‘justice’ because they were presented as such, that is 
to say, as forms of ‘justice’. We intentionally refrain from adopting a fixed definition of 
justice. Indeed, our argument is based on the recognition that justice is an inherently political 
concept,26 the meaning of which is and must be constantly subject to political contestation.  
Secondly, we present neither of these alternative conceptions as inherently better than 
any of the other conceptions, including international criminal law. Recognition of the aim of 
protecting diversity should foreclose attempts to monopolise or close-off discourses on 
justice by invoking ‘local’ as presumably more ‘authentic’ articulations of justice just as 
much as it should foreclose such attempts by the invocation of international criminal law.
27
   
Finally, it must be stressed that our argument is not a cultural relativistic one. We do 
not argue that the explanation for the alternative conceptions of justice is found in cultural 
differences; the alternative conceptions of justice that we discuss probably exist, to a greater 
or lesser extent, in all societies. How such societies prioritise these conceptions of justice will 
depend on the context. For instance, below we show how the Acholi, an ethnic group in 
northern Uganda, opposed ICC action against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), at least 
partially on the ground that international criminal justice does not amount to ‘justice’ and that 
the justice they prefer is a justice that restores rather than punishes. However, the same 
people criticized the ICC for not investigating and prosecuting state actors; for state actors, 
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ICC-style justice was considered appropriate. Whether or not a particular action is considered 
as a form of ‘justice’ thus depended on the person’s relationship to the recipient of that 
‘justice’, namely whether the person was considered part of the community or not. 28 
Similarly, views on international criminal justice changed over the years. When the LRA was 
still in northern Uganda and a direct threat to people’s security, many Acholi criticized ICC-
style justice for the LRA. Now the LRA is no longer in northern Uganda, fewer Acholi 
vehemently oppose this style of justice, simply because it is less directly relevant to them. 
Whether in northern Uganda, Sudan or anywhere else in the world, context matters for how 
justice is defined.  
A. Alternative Conception I: Restoration of Relationships29 
The first example of an alternative conception of justice is the most radical. It 
suggests not just that there are alternative concepts of justice, but even that international-
criminal-style justice does not resonate with everyone as amounting to ‘justice’. In 
discussions about the mechanisms of the Acholi to address wrongs, one Ugandan explained 
that the term ‘justice’ does not exist as an Acholi notion.30 The term used to cover the English 
word ‘justice’ means ‘correct judgment’ or ‘interpretation’.31 More relevant to the Acholi 
experience of justice is roco wat, which means ‘to restore relationships’.32 Where an official 
aim of international criminal justice is to incapacitate and to exclude, Acholi justice 
ceremonies are tailored to including, focused as they are on restoring relationships within the 
community. Essential to such restoration are community rituals and compensation.  
Lobbying against ICC involvement in northern Uganda, Acholi leaders thus dismissed 
the type of justice done by the ICC. One religious leader, for instance, argued:  
                                                          
28
 See also, and more elaborately, H. Porter, After Rape: Justice and Social Harmony in Northern Uganda (PhD 
thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science), 
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 Nouwen’s interview with an expert, Gulu, September 2008. On different understandings of the concept 
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The court system is justice through punishment. The offender and offended are put 
aside. This leads to polarization which will lead to death.33 
Instead, the Acholi leaders emphasized the merits of their own justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms.
34
  
 To some extent, this advocacy for an alternative conception of justice was successful: 
donors provided funding for the organization of Acholi justice and reconciliation events and 
one of the mechanisms, the mato oput ceremony (‘drinking the bitter root’) became not only 
part of the national vocabulary, but also gained international attention.
35
Scholars, 
international lawyers and transitional-justice activists visited northern Uganda to study the 
mechanisms.  
However, Acholi justice and reconciliation mechanisms did not succeed in becoming 
an equal alternative to the framework of international criminal law. Since the ICC 
intervention, international criminal law was the international point of reference for ‘justice’ in 
Uganda. Acholi justice and reconciliation mechanisms were thus evaluated from the 
perspective, and within the framework, of ICC-style justice. More specifically, the question 
was whether the Acholi mechanisms could be used to challenge the admissibility of the 
Ugandan case before the Court, on the ground of the principle of complementarity, according 
to which domestic investigations and prosecutions enjoy primacy to the ICC.
36
 International 
human rights NGOs who visited northern Uganda to assess the quality of Acholi justice from 
the perspective of ICC-style justice advised the Acholi leaders: ‘If you want traditional 
justice to be credible, you’ll have to adapt it so that it can deal with war crimes and crimes 
against humanity’. 37  In order to deal with international crimes, so it was argued, local 
justice
38
 had to be transformed from being communal to individual, to mete out punishment 
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rather than provide compensation, to focus on the perpetrator instead of the victim, and to 
turn cleansing ceremonies into accountability mechanisms. For his part, an ICC judge, indeed 
the Ugandan judge, publicly stated:  
Crimes against humanity, genocide, aggression against other states and war crimes are 
internationally condemned and cannot be tried by traditional courts but by the ICC … 
You cannot expect someone who caused the death of 100 people to be tried in a 
traditional court if you are looking for justice to be done … You must convince the 
international community that justice was done and that the punishment is 
proportionate with the crime.
39
 
When crimes have been committed that ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ the primary 
concern is thus not to discover what conceptions of justice prevail in the communities that 
have been directly victimized (not just by the crimes, but also more generally by the conflict 
in the context of which the crimes took place). Rather, when an international criminal court is 
involved, the primary concern becomes ‘convinc[ing] the international community that 
justice [is] done’, that is, that the form of justice preferred by the ‘international community’ is 
done. Contrasted with the ICC’s ‘global justice’, other conceptions of justice all of a sudden 
appear as particular, local and traditional. Such traditions are accepted as forms of justice in 
addition to international criminal justice. But as alternatives to international criminal justice 
they are accepted only if they live up to the apparently ‘de-localized’, ‘modern’ and most of 
all ‘higher’ standards of ‘global justice’ applied by the ICC. 
What is more, in order for alternative conceptions of justice to be heard as alternatives 
to international criminal justice, they must be articulated in the vocabulary of international 
criminal justice. Take for example the way in which the LRA delegation at the Juba peace 
talks advocated for Acholi forms of justice. Apparently aware of what Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal calls the ‘somewhat tragic reality that resistance must work, to some extent, within 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Alternative’ suggests that another mechanism is the standard, whereas for many people it is not. Moreover, 
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39
 J. Maseruka, ‘“Traditional Justice Not Applicable to War Suspects”’, New Vision, 30 June 2009. 
13 
 
the parameters established by that which is being resisted’,40 the LRA delegation insisted that 
the peace agreement described traditional justice in terms used by proponents of international 
criminal justice. Resisting the ICC, preferring Acholi forms of justice, and aware that the 
‘international community’ had to be convinced of the merits Acholi justice, it insisted that the 
description of Acholi practices used the vocabulary of international criminal law. Thus, at the 
delegation’s instigation, ‘full accountability’ was added to the definition of each and every 
practice listed in the Accountability and Reconciliation Agreement. 41  It is thus that the 
definition of mato oput in the peace agreement reads: ‘the traditional ritual performed by the 
Acholi after full accountability and reconciliation has been attained between parties formerly 
in conflict, after full accountability.’42 The deliberate duplication suggests that in the LRA 
delegation’s view it could not be stressed enough that local justice practices, like the ICC, 
pursue ‘full accountability’. Restorative justice practices are thus redefined in the language of 
international criminal law. 
 
B. Alternative Conception II: Ending Ongoing Violations 
A second example of an alternative conception of justice is that of ending ongoing 
violations, which usually means ending the conflict in the context of which the crimes take 
place. Thus, when a Darfurian who had stated ‘We need NATO, the EU and the ICC’ was 
asked why Darfurians needed the ICC, the conversation continued as follows: 
For justice.  
What is ‘justice’? 
Justice is the end of the war. 
How is the ICC going to end the war? 
By arresting President Bashir and his party. 
And then? 
Once there is peace in Darfur, the ajaweed [respected elders] will do real justice.  
                                                          
40
 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 10. See also S. Wastell, ‘Presuming Scale, Making 
Diversity: On the Mischiefs of Measurement and the Global: Local Metonym in Theories of Law and Culture’, 
21(2) Critique of Anthropology (2001) 185-210, at 194.   
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 Nouwen’s interview with a member of the Juba mediation team, Kampala, September 2008. 
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 See Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, 29 June 2007, clause 1 para. 9 (emphases added). See also clause 
1 para. 8: ‘“Kayo Cuk” refers to the traditional accountability and reconciliation processes practiced [sic] by the 
Langi communities after full accountability and reconciliation has been attained between parties formerly in 
conflict, after full accountability’ (emphases added).   
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What is real justice? 
Real justice is done through judiya [a mix of mediation and arbitration between 
groups, resulting in compensation and arrangements for future co-existence].
43
 
 
For this Darfurian ‘real justice’ focuses on restorative justice. The intermediate form of 
justice is an end to the conflict. To some extent, international criminal law indeed aims at 
‘ending’: the aims of deterrence, prevention and incapacitation of offenders focus on ending 
crimes. However, ending crimes is different from ending conflict. More fundamentally, 
deontological in character, international criminal justice is enforced even if in a particular 
situation it does not appear to prevent further crimes or stop ongoing ones. In this context it is 
worthwhile to reconsider the ICTY’s claim that ‘[t]he Tribunal has laid the foundations for 
what is now the accepted norm for conflict resolution’. The question arises in what ways 
international criminal justice resolves conflicts. Did the ICTY resolve the conflict in Bosnia? 
Or did the Dayton agreement begin doing so, in spite of the ICTY? According to one writer 
on the Yugoslav peace process, the lesson from the former Yugoslavia is that ‘quest for 
justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it 
makes today’s living the dead of tomorrow. ... The pursuit of criminals is one thing. Making 
peace is another.’44 In other places of the world, too, we have seen that arrest warrants that 
are difficult to enforce may make conflict more intractable, and thus may make the resolution 
of conflict, necessary for the ending of crime, more difficult.
45
  
To the extent that the idea ‘no peace without criminal justice’ underpins international 
criminal law, it does so as a principled idea (an idea about right and wrong which cannot be 
easily resolved with reference to evidence) rather than as a causal idea (an idea about cause 
and effect, supported by evidence).46 When international arrest warrants in fact make the 
conclusion of a peace agreement more difficult and therefore in effect lead to a continuation 
of the conflict and crimes, the pursuit of one type of justice (the enforcement of international 
criminal law) may thus prevent the realization of another type (the end of a conflict and the 
crimes committed in the context of that conflict).  
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It was for this reason that in March 2005, six Acholi community leaders from 
northern Uganda went to The Hague to try and convince the ICC Prosecutor to discontinue 
his proceedings in northern Uganda.47 The Acholi leaders stated that they had asked the 
Prosecutor ‘that he is mindful of our traditional justice and reconciliation process and that he 
is also mindful of the peace process and dialogue’.48 On his part, the Prosecutor echoed that 
he was ‘mindful of traditional justice and reconciliation processes and sensitive to the 
leaders’ efforts to promote dialogue between different actors in order to achieve peace’.49  
The Government of Uganda criticized the encounter between the Prosecutor and the 
Acholi leaders, arguing as it did that it was not the role of community leaders internationally 
to take political positions that went against that of the Government.
50
 As a compromise, a 
new delegation was sent to The Hague which included, in addition to Acholi community 
leaders, many people affiliated with the Government. This time, the Prosecutor and the 
Ugandan delegation agreed on a joint statement and proclaimed:  
The Lango; Acholi; Iteso and Madi community leaders and the Prosecutor of the ICC 
have agreed to work together as part of a common effort to achieve justice and 
reconciliation, the rebuilding of communities and an end to the violence in Northern 
Uganda.
51
  
Seemingly similar to the first statement, this statement was fundamentally different in that it 
no longer referred to the one issue on which the ICC and the local leaders disagreed: the 
importance of a peace process. The Acholi leaders had insisted that a peace process was 
essential for ongoing violations to end, and thus for justice. But this conception of justice was 
eliminated from the joint press statement released by the ICC. 
 Almost a decade later, Acholi opposition to the ICC has diminished. The primary 
reason is that as a result of the Juba peace talks, the LRA has left northern Uganda and has 
become less of a direct threat to the Acholi. In northern Uganda, the situation is relatively 
peaceful. However, with the LRA continuing to make victims in South Sudan, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, the Juba peace talks 
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were not successful in ending the conflict with, and crimes committed by, the LRA. After two 
years of on-and-off negotiations between 2006 and 2008, LRA leader Joseph Kony refused to 
sign the carefully negotiated Final Peace Agreement. Claims according to which the ICC 
arrest warrants served as a sword to bring the LRA to the peace table thus reveal only one 
side of the sword. Like every sword, the ICC arrest warrants were double-edged, the sharpest 
side being an insurmountable obstacle to developing Kony’s trust in the value of any 
agreement.52 Justice in the sense of ending ongoing violations by the LRA has thus not been 
done.  
C. Alternative Conception III: Redistribution 
A third alternative notion of justice is that of justice as redistribution. Whereas 
injustice in terms of violations of international criminal law is often the consequence of 
conflict, injustice in terms of distribution of wealth, power and opportunities is often its 
cause. The remedying of distributional injustices can thus be experienced as a genuine 
improvement in the lives of those who have suffered from such injustices, and therefore as 
justice. It is in this light that a traditional leader in Darfur responded when asked what justice 
meant: ‘Justice is security, power-sharing and wealth-sharing’. 53  International criminal 
justice, by contrast, describes complex political struggles in terms of the criminal guilt of a 
few individuals and dismisses structural distributional issues as irrelevant or reduces these to 
‘context’.  
Another element of the concept of justice as wealth distribution is justice as 
compensation for suffered harm. After many conflicts, victims of that conflict (as opposed to 
only victims of international crimes) often first and foremost want compensation. For those 
starving, the truism remains valid: ‘without food, no justice’.54 But compensation is a demand 
beyond avoiding starvation. To people who have been deprived of everything, compensation 
can make the difference between experiencing agency or total dependence on charity. In that 
sense, justice as compensation fundamentally differs from justice in the sense of enforcement 
of international criminal law. The former tends to treat the victim as an agent who, with the 
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compensation, has the means to reclaim ownership of a violated life; the latter acts in the 
name of the victim who remains a passive object of the benevolence of international criminal 
lawyers.55 
The Rome Statute gives victims a more prominent role than other international 
criminal tribunals have done. However, whether or not one can obtain reparations through the 
Rome Statute system depends to a large extent on decisions by others than victims, in 
particular the prosecutor and judges. It depends, for instance, on where investigations are 
opened, which period is investigated, which crimes and which individuals are prosecuted and 
whether the accused is convicted.56  In sum, the victim-oriented provisions remain secondary 
to that of the criminal trial and the redistributive conception of justice secondary to that of 
accountability and punishment.  
D. Alternative Conception IV: Justice as accountability and punishment 
A fourth concept of justice is justice as accountability and punishment. This seems to be 
precisely what international criminal law is all about. However, methods of accountability 
and perceptions of punishment vary. To many people who have lost homes, jobs and food 
security, detention in Scheveningen and subsequent imprisonment in western prisons does not 
amount to punishment. As one Acholi elder argued:  
If [the LRA leaders] are taken to The Hague, they will be locked up with air 
conditioning and will live the lifestyle of Ugandan ministers. But they will have to 
come here and make up with the community. Let them live with the people whose 
ears they have chopped off. Let them see for the rest of their lives what suffering they 
have caused. That is punishment. In our view, ICC punishment is very light. Let them 
morally come and confess.
57
 
In this view, true punishment of LRA members would involve confession and living with the 
people whose lives they have wretched, to see what they have done and to share the same 
poverty. 
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 E. Alternative Conception V: Justice as Equality 
Finally, one other example of an alternative concept of justice is that of equality – not 
material equality (which relates more to distributive justice) but to equality before the law. 
International criminal justice institutions have often delivered partial justice – this is not to 
say that they are biased in a specific case, but that they cannot address all crimes and 
therefore select. Such selection is not problematic if the criteria used relate to, for instance, 
the seriousness of the crime or the potential deterrent effect of the prosecution. What is more 
problematic is that in fact selection has also been influenced by a host of external factors, 
including the extent to which co-operation is likely to be forthcoming. At the domestic level, 
states cooperate with the ICC if their enemies are put on trial, but not if the government is 
accused. At the global level, states cooperate if the international tribunal’s selection is in 
accordance with their own foreign policies. The result is not merely that in some cases there 
is cooperation and in others not, but that international criminal tribunals, so aware of their 
dependence on cooperation, do not threaten the cooperation they get in some cases by going 
after those on whose cooperation they depend or their protégées. At least in part as a result of 
such considerations, all the ICC’s investigations to date have been on the African continent.  
In response to criticism of partial justice, the selectiveness has been justified on the 
ground that it is the result of an impartial assessment of what global justice requires. 
However, this only exacerbates the experience of injustice. Take for example how the ICC 
Presidency responded to the critique of the African Union that the ICC was targeting Africa:   
The ICC operates strictly within the mandate and legal framework created by the 
Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the Court, and cannot take political factors into 
account. Decisions are taken independently on the basis of the law and the available 
evidence and are not based on regional or ethnic considerations.
58
   
Of course, it is hardly surprising to find the Presidency of the ICC denying external 
influences on its decisions. Yet, the response from the ICC to the African Union intensifies 
the experience of injustice by presumptuously denying the legitimacy of concerns about the 
geographical bias of the Court’s selection procedures. The statement conveys that all the 
Court does is applying objective standards, and those who feel uncomfortable about the 
outcomes apparently fail to see how global justice is to be done by the ICC.    
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Faith in international criminal law will make the international justice cup look half 
full rather than half empty: it is better to have some accountability than none. But if some 
groups or regions are targeted structurally while others are not, those who drink from a 
different justice cup, namely that of equality, will see the levels of justice in their cup going 
down as a result of the pursuit of international criminal law: more international criminal 
justice means the entrenchment of existing inequalities and thus less justice. 
4. Beyond endless complementarities, towards self-restraint 
We argue that these alternative conceptions of justice have been pushed to the 
margins by the increasingly dominant use of international criminal law to frame and thus to 
understand political issues and by tendencies to equate international criminal law with global 
justice. We do not criticise international criminal law for not itself promoting these 
alternative conceptions of justice. First, it is not international criminal law itself that is 
responsible for its own dominance — the promotion and prioritization of the international- 
criminal-law frame is done by those actors (courts, tribunals, NGOs, scholars) that present 
international criminal law as the primary, and as an indispensable, means to achieve global 
justice. Secondly, we do not argue that international criminal law should also promote 
alternative conceptions of justice.  
Nor do we argue that international criminal law has extinguished these alternative 
conceptions.59 In fact, most supporters of international criminal law do not claim that 
international criminal law is the only way in which international crimes should be responded 
to, or that international criminal law should have a monopoly on the use of the term global 
justice. Indeed, in response to these alternative conceptions of justice, international-criminal- 
justice advocates often recognise that the concept of justice can encompass more than only 
international criminal justice, pointing to the existence of the overlapping but broader field of 
transitional justice. Similarly, few of the alternative conceptions of justice presented above 
are mutually exclusive or indeed incompatible with international criminal justice. Most of the 
alternative conceptions intersect and could be pursued at the same time as justice through 
international criminal law. The proponents of alternative conceptions of global justice 
themselves are thus not necessarily always opposed to international criminal law. Rather, 
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they oppose a practice of international criminal justice that does injustice to these alternative 
conceptions by prioritising international criminal law as the frame through which to analyse 
and address a situation and by presenting international criminal law as a primary and 
indispensable means to achieve global justice.   
Against this background it comes as no surprise that the word ‘complementarity’ is 
frequently invoked to argue that international criminal law does not have the monopoly on 
responses to mass atrocity or the term global justice. The argument is that other conceptions 
could and should be ‘complementary’ to international criminal justice. People desire, need 
and are entitled to, and restorative justice, and distributive justice, and equality before the 
law and retributive justice.  
However, complementarity is not the solution for creating more space for alternative 
conceptions of justice. First, the meaning of complementarity as a legal concept deviates 
from the seemingly literal meaning of the term.60 As set forth by articles 17 and 20 of the 
Rome Statute, complementarity is an admissibility rule that in the event of competing claims 
to jurisdiction in a specific case between a national jurisdiction and the ICC, grants priority to 
the domestic jurisdiction by declaring the case inadmissible before the ICC, as long as the 
state is willing and able genuinely to conduct those proceedings. For the state or defendant 
successfully to invoke complementarity, it must, however, conduct genuine ‘investigations’ 
or ‘prosecutions’. The text of the provisions indicates that the investigations must be with a 
view to prosecution, that is to say, criminal investigations.61 Complementarity in a legal sense 
thus creates space for an alternative forum of criminal jurisdiction to that of the ICC, but not 
to an alternative conception of justice: for the purposes of complementarity, the domestic 
justice would have to be criminal justice.62  
Secondly, even in the literal meaning of various forms of justice ‘complementing’ 
each other, ‘complementarity’ does not provide a solution. For in reality this is not a world of 
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endless ‘complementarities’ in which all conceptions of justice always seamlessly 
‘complement’ each other. The real issue is not whether both restorative justice and 
distributive justice, as well as equality before the law and retributive justice can be pursued 
— which is obviously possible — but which conception of justice prevails in times of clashes 
or limited resources. In a world of horrific constraint, conceptions of justice compete for their 
realization. 
In this political struggle, institutionalization serves to construct, defend and expand 
the values promoted. The institutionalization of international criminal law is a way to 
construct, defend and expand one particular type of justice, namely that of individual criminal 
accountability. As it is, other conceptions of justice than international criminal law do not 
enjoy similar institutionalization at the international plane and are thus in a weaker position.  
The result is that international criminal law, with all its international tribunals 
enforcing it, is overpowering other conceptions of justice. In doing so, it threatens precisely 
one of the longings for justice that international criminal law was meant to realise: 
international criminal law was meant, among other aims, to protect human diversity; the idea 
that the world is made up of a multitude of individuals and cultures with their own 
perspective of history, identity and, importantly, justice.  
The analysis that the dominance of international criminal law is due to its 
international institutionalization might suggest that, for a better protection of pluriformity, 
alternative conceptions of justice should also receive international institutionalization. 
International institutionalization could ensure that those other conceptions of justice are better 
protected and promoted at the international plane, for instance, through a global 
reconciliation commission, a global wealth distribution fund or a global equality commission. 
However, even then, such institutions may become subjected to one dominant discourse on 
justice that prevails over the other, for instance, in arguments that serious offenders must be 
taken to international criminal courts, whereas the smaller offenders can be taken to a truth 
and reconciliation commission.  
Similarly, while international-criminal-law institutions themselves could demonstrate 
more respect for alternative conceptions of justice, we do not believe in amending their 
statutes to make the institutions more open towards approaches alternative to international 
criminal law. For in that case, international-criminal-law institutions would still the 
arbitrators of the meaning and prioritization of justice.  
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Fundamentally, what is necessary is not more institutions to fill a ‘vacuum’ or a 
central institution from which to administer pluralism, but protection of precisely that 
‘vacuum’ or the creation of space without a central justice administrator. A space must be 
protected where the meaning of justice can continuously be contested. At present, this 
requires first and foremost that the enforcers of international criminal law respect the 
limitations that flow from at least one of the rationales for international crimes: the protection 
of diversity. For the need to protect a pluralistic humanity not only offers a possible 
justification for international criminal law; the very same idea also sets significant limits to 
the project of international criminal justice. One such limit is that one particular type of 
justice, international criminal justice, cannot make an exclusive claim to global justice, a 
hierarchically superior type of justice.  
A space must be protected that secures our awareness of the gap between our 
institutions and our ideals.63 This calls for a qualification of the faith in institutions, including 
in international criminal law.64 Whilst faith may bridge the gap between the awareness of 
shortcomings today and the hope for a future in which these shortcomings have been 
overcome, it makes one forget, ignore or deny that human law, culture and conventions will 
always be short of the justice we strive for because justice is mediated by men. The denial of 
this mediation, for instance in assertions that international criminal law does justice (instead 
of strives for it) or that it represents justice (rather than imperfectly mirrors an ideal) sows the 
seeds of intolerance, no matter how liberal the origins of international criminal law.
65
 Justice, 
not unlike democracy or the rule of law, needs limitations on its enforcement and space for 
contestation for its preservation.  
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